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 I: Introduction 
Since 1960, the formation of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) that exclude the United 
States has been proliferating throughout Central and South America: Mercado Comun del Sur 
(MERCOSUR), the Andean Community, the Central America Common Market (CACM), the 
Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM), and the G-3 agreement among Venezuela, Columbia, 
and Mexico. In addition, Chile has established its own agreement with MERCOSUR, as well as a 
long list of other bilateral agreements.  
The rapid proliferation of these RTAs has engendered concerns about the disadvantages 
they bequeath upon non-members. Reeder, Torene, Jabara, and Babula (2005), in their analysis 
of “Regional Trade Agreements: Effects of the Andean and MERCOSUR Pact on the 
Venezuelan soybean Trade and U.S. Exports”, affirmed and concluded that RTAs that exclude 
the United States can work to the disadvantage of U.S. exporters that are otherwise competitive 
in world markets.  
In both Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions, preferential tariffs are granted to 
members while tariffs on third-country exports remain unchanged. This is by far, the most 
fundamental concern of third-country exporters because they face stiffer competition from 
suppliers within the bloc whose exporters now enjoy a preferential tariff rate, which coerce price 
and/or sales to reduce (trade diversion).  
Nonetheless, Customs Unions (e.g. MERCOSUR and the Andean Community) have a 
propensity to be less disadvantageous for third-countries because even though they grant 
preferential tariffs to members, they also change third-country tariffs by establishing a common 
external tariff (CET). In most cases, tariffs are reduced in the CET; thus there may be 
improvement, or at least less deterioration, in third-country exports prospects. Consequently, before Viner (1950), analysts often assumed that a customs union would 
be welfare improving, since some tariffs would fall and tariffs are, in general, welfare reducing. 
However, in 1950 Jacob Viner showed that a customs union will not necessarily improve 
welfare, since the tariff reductions occur in a world of second best (Clausing 2001).  
Trade diversion is revealed by a decline in the income elasticity of demand for extra-area 
imports following integration. This occurs when RTA members shift their imports from more 
efficient, nonmember producers, to less efficient partner countries within the RTA due to 
preferential tariff treatment. This hurts consumers within the RTA, who now import from high-
cost members in the RTA (Burfisher 1998).  
In addition, trade diversion leads to less efficient allocation of resources in the global 
economy, and directly harms countries outside the agreement. It may, if severe enough, even hurt 
members. If trade diversion is not too severe, however, it may benefit members more than it hurt 
outsiders, so that the net effect on the world economy is positive (ERS/USDA, 1998).   
Unfortunately, all of the potential problems described above are present in MERCOSUR 
and the Andean Community. These RTAs pose a tremendous treat for U.S. cotton exports to 
beneficiaries of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). Reason being, most of the CBI 
beneficiaries have additional trade agreements with MERCOSUR and the Andean Community. 
As a result, the U.S. can become comparably disadvantaged because of stiffer competition from 
supplies within the respective trading blocs. Consequently, U.S. cotton exports to the CBI 
beneficiaries can be diverted. This paper analyzes the effects these regional trade agreements 
have on CBI countries cotton imports from U.S. by calculating the associated trade creation and 
trade diversion values. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows:  Section II describes U.S.-CBI trade 
partnership; Section III provides the generalized framework of the import demand model; 
Section IV discusses data and estimation procedures; Section V provides the detailed steps in 
calculating trade creation and trade diversion; Section VI discusses the results; and Section VII 
provides conclusion of the study. 
II: U.S. - CBI Partnership 
  The CBI plan was first announced by President Regan on February 24, 1982 and became 
effective on January 1, 1984. The central premise behind the plan was that, by encouraging the 
CBI countries to become more open and liberal, trade would expand – and eventually translate 
into economic development and growth (Deere1990). Today it is a general term used to refer to 
the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act of 1983 (CBERA), the Caribbean Basin Economic 
Recovery Expansion Act of 1990 (CBERA Expansion Act), and the Caribbean Basin Trade 
Partnership of 2000 (CBTPA) (Ozden and Sharma 2006). 
  As of October, 2000, twenty four countries have been designated CBI beneficiaries : 
Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, British Virgin Islands, Costa Rica, 
Dominica Islands, The Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, 
Honduras, Jamaica, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. 
Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. In this study, we will focus on 
the top eight CBI export markets for U.S. cotton, from 1989 - 2007: Bahamas, Barbados, Costa 
Rica, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Panama, and Trinidad and Tobago.  
  The partnership between the U.S. and the CBI provides duty and quota free treatment for 
1) textile and apparel products assembled from U.S. fabric in CBI beneficiary countries from 
U.S. fabric and 2) yarn and apparel assembled from CBI regional fabric, subject to a quantitative limit which increases over time. The CBI will promote U.S. investment in the Caribbean Basin 
and help strengthen the international competitive position of the U.S. textile industry. These 
provisions are harbingers of success for U.S. cotton because they will induce increased U.S. 
exports of cotton fabric and yarn to the Caribbean and stimulate U.S. domestic consumption of 
fabric and thread for export.    
Cotton is a major commodity for the U.S. generating about $4-5 billion in annual cash 
receipts (Dodson 1995). By value, cotton ranks fifth among agricultural commodities 
Furthermore, cotton is a major raw material for the textile and apparel industries creating heavy 
dependence by these industries on cotton production. The demand for raw fiber is derived from 
consumer demand for textile products where cotton is an important textile fiber (Marseli and 
Epperson, 2002). U.S. cotton exports to CBI countries over the past two decades have been fairly 
consistent. Following a trend of rapid growth in the early 1990s, there was a slight drop in the 
later part of that decade. However, there has been significant increase in the last two years.  
  The overall objective of this study is to analyze cotton trade among the CBI, 
MERCOSUR, and the Andean Community to determine effects of these RTAs on U.S. exports 
to the CBI. Specific objectives are to 1) examine factors influencing U.S. cotton exports to the 
CBI; 2) econometrically determine whether trade is created or diverted for U.S. cotton exports to 
the CBI. III - Development of an Empirical Method 
A CBI cotton import demand model was developed to estimate the effects of 
macroeconomic factors on U.S. cotton exports to the top eight CBI importing countries: 
Bahamas, Barbados, Costa Rica, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Panama, and Trinidad and 
Tobago. Trade creation and diversion effects are calculated using the estimated demand 
elasticity with respect to import price.  
CBI cotton imports are estimated as a function of real imported price of cotton; 
real GDP of importing countries; real exchange rates between U.S. and importing 
country; import tariff on cotton in importing country; and dummy variables for 
MERCOSUR and The Andean Community. The CBI import demand model for U.S. 
cotton is specified as: 
QMit = f (Pt, RGDPit, RERit, TARit, DMER, DAND)                                                   (1) 
Assuming a linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables, 
the import demand model is estimated as follows: 
QMt = α + β1Pt  + β2RGDPit  + β3 RERit  + β4TARit  + β5DMER + β6DAND              (2) 
Where α = intercept term 
  β1-6 = partial effect of independent variables on QMt 
QMt = quantity of imports of U.S. cotton by top eight CBI importers in time t 
  Pt = price of U.S. cotton in time t  
  RGDPit = real GDP in importing country i in time t 
  RERit = real exchange rate between the U.S. and importing country in time t 
  TARit = import tariffs on U.S. cotton in country i in time t 
  DMER = dummy variable for MERCOSUR countries   DAND = dummy variable for the Andean Community members 
Earlier studies that utilized similar import demand models, made the import value 
(price times quantity) the dependent variable. However, to remain consistent with 
economic theory the dependent variable in this study is the quantity of U.S. cotton 
imported. Prices used for this study are unit values for exports and imports, calculated by 
dividing the value of trade by the quantity of trade. From economic theory, price and 
quantity have a negative relationship. It is therefore expected that an increase in the price 
of cotton will result in a decrease in the quantity of cotton demanded/imported and vice 
versa. 
  According to Koo, Kamera, and Taylor (1994), the income (GDP) of exporting 
countries represents the country’s production capacity, and the income of importing 
countries represents the country’s purchasing power, both of which are positively related 
to trade flows. It is expected that an increase in income in the importing country will 
result in an increase in that country’s imports of U.S. cotton. An increase in real GDP 
should increase imports, depending on how sensitive the consumption is to changes in 
income. 
  Bajpai and Mohanty (2008) argued that the exchange rate is arguably the single 
most important variable in determining the economic environment for trade sectors. In 
addition, Koo, Kamera, and Taylor (1994), asserted that exchange rate is one of the most 
important factors affecting trade flows. In this study, the exchange rate is a ratio of the 
CBI top importers’ currency to the U.S. dollar. Economic theory predicts that U.S. 
exports will decrease when the U.S. dollar strengthens/appreciates relative to the 
currency of the importing country, and vice versa. Furthermore, as the U.S. dollar gains strength U.S. exports become more expensive in the foreign market. Thus, it is expected 
that U.S. exports will have a negative relationship with the value of the U.S. dollar.  
IV – Estimation procedures and Data 
The import demand model used panel data for eight countries with annual 
observations from 1989-2007. A pooling technique, the process of combining cross-
section and time series data, is used in the analysis.  
U.S. cotton exports to CBI countries were obtained from the United States 
International Trade Commission (USITC) database. The prices were computed by 
dividing the value of imports by the quantity. The data are measured in U.S. dollars and 
are converted into real dollars for the analysis using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
Export data for MERCOSUR and the Andean Community were obtained from the UN 
COMTRADE database.  
  Real GDP data from each country were obtained from the International Monetary 
Fund’s World Economic Outlook database. These data are converted to U.S. dollars to 
maintain a common unit of measure. Tariff data were obtained from the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) database. Tariff data for the Bahamas was unavailable so they were 
estimated. 
  The real exchange data between the U.S. dollar and each foreign currency were 
obtained from the Economic Research Service (ERS). These data are measured as the 
foreign currency per U.S. dollar, which means that an increase indicates appreciation of 
the U.S. dollar and a decrease means depreciation for the U.S. dollar.  
V – Trade Creation and Trade Diversion 
If tariffs between the U.S. and the Caribbean Basin Initiative are removed, trade volume between the U.S. and the CBI will increase through trade creation and trade 
diversion effects. This study uses the Baldwin and Murray (1977) method the calculate 
trade creation effects: 
TC = M e (∆t / (1 + t)                                                                                                    (3) 
Where TC = trade creation effect for imports of U.S. cotton by top eight CBI importers 
 M  = average level of cotton imports for U.S. 
 e  = import demand elasticity with respect to price  
  ∆t = changes in tariff 
 t  = initial level of tariffs 
  The trade diversion effect is not easy to calculate, mainly because of difficulties in 
empirically estimating substitution elasticities between commodities produced by 
member countries and those produced by other countries. Baldwin and Murray (1977) 
estimated trade diversion effects using the following equation: 
TD = TC (Mn / V)                                                                                                         (4) 
Where TD = trade diversion effect for imports of U.S. cotton by top eight CBI importers 
  Mn = average imports of cotton from non-member countries 
V = domestic production by top eight CBI importers 
  Verdoorn (1960) provided an alternative method for estimating trade diversion: 
  5) TD = TC (Mn / Mt)                                                                                       (5) 
Where (Mn / Mt) is the ratio of cotton imports from non-member countries to the 
country’s total imports. 
  For empirical applications, the use of the Baldwin and Murray method requires 
domestic production which is frequently unavailable (Sawyer and Sprinkle, 1989). As a result, the Verdoorn method has been more frequently used to compute trade diversion 
(Koo and Mattson, 2001). This study uses the Verdoorn method to calculate trade 
diversion effects.  
  (Koo and Mattson, 2001), computed trade expansion, which is the sum of trade 
creation and trade diversion effects using the demand elasticity with respect to tariffs (λ): 
TE = TC + TD= M λ (∆t / t)                                                                                      (6)  
Where TE is the total increase in trade resulting from elimination of tariff under the non-
reciprocal trade arrangement.  
  Since the import demand elasticity with respect to import tariffs can be calculated 
form import demand models, TE is calculated using equation 6. The TC effect can be 
calculated by combining equations 5 and 6 as follows (Koo and Mattson, 2001): 
TC = TE / [1 – (Mn / Mt)].                                                                                             (7) 
V – Results and Discussion 
This section discusses the descriptive statistics (table 1) and the estimation results 
for the one-way fixed effect panel estimator (table 2). According to the F-statistics test 
we cannot ignore the cyclic and cross-sectional effects as the F-statistics for the one way 
FEM is significant at (P < 0.0001). Thus, the probability that there are no effects in the 
model is zero. The R
2 for the import demand model is 0.82, indicating that the model is a 
good fit. Table 2 presents  
The own price elasticity of CBI cotton import demand is very inelastic (-0.545), 
indicating that CBI cotton imports from the U.S. are not sensitive to price changes; i.e. a 
one percent increase in the imported price of cotton would reduce CBI imports by 0.545 
percent. Real GDP in the top eight cotton importing CBI countries has a positive and 
significant effect on U.S. cotton exports. Thus, as income in these countries rises, so will 
their imports of U.S. cotton.  The income elasticity of CBI import demand is extremely 
inelastic (0.0074), indicating that CBI cotton imports from the U.S. are also not sensitive 
to importers’ income, i.e., a one percent increase in real GDP would result in only a 0.007 
percent increase in CBI cotton imports. This inelastic demand can be explained by the 
fact that cotton is used for apparel/clothing which is a necessity. Koo and Mattson (2001) 
also concluded that U.S. agricultural exports to this hemisphere are positively influenced 
by real GDP in the importing country.  
The results also show that tariffs have a negative but insignificant effect on U.S. 
cotton exports. These results were expected 
  The coefficient of the exchange rate variable in the model is negative and 
significant. This result supports the theory that the appreciation of the U.S. dollar relative 
to the currency of the importing country will have a negative effect on U.S. exports. In 
other words, as the U.S. dollar appreciates relative to the importing country’s currency, 
U.S. exports to these countries become more expensive. Consequently, the importing 
country will be coerced to import less U.S. cotton. The exchange rate elasticity of CBI 
import demand is very elastic (5.73), indicating that CBI imports are very sensitive to the 
appreciation of the U.S. dollar; i.e., a one percent increase in the value of the U.S. dollar 
will result in a 5.73 percent decrease in imports by CBI countries. Koo and Mattson 
(2001) concurred and also concluded that U.S. agricultural exports are negatively 
influenced by the strength of the U.S. dollar.  The ANDEAN dummy variable in the import demand model was insignificant 
and did not provide any additional information in estimating the model. Conversely, the 
coefficient of the MERCOSUR dummy variable is negative and significant, which was 
expected. These results indicate that MERCOSUR has a negative impact on U.S. cotton 
exports to the CBI i.e., a one percent increase in cotton exports by MERCOSUR to the 
CBI would result in a 9.33 percent decrease in U.S. cotton exports to the CBI.  
Trade Creation and Trade Diversion 
  Calculated trade creation, trade diversion, and trade expansion effects are shown 
in table 3. The elimination of tariffs by the eight CBI countries would increase U.S. 
cotton exports by $2.3 million. About 88 percent of the increased U.S. cotton exports are 
due to trade creation, and the remaining 12 percent is due to trade diversion.  
 The  insignificant  trade  diversion effects on U.S. exports, indicates that 
MERCOSUR and the Andean Community pose an insubstantial treat to U.S. exports to 
the top eight importing CBI countries.  
  These results are congruent with the empirical findings of other researchers. 
Burfisher and Jones (1998), e.g., found that the regional free trade agreements have both 
trade creation and trade diversion effects in agriculture, but trade creation dominates in 
most regional agreements. This study finds that the trade creation effects of the U.S. – 
CBI agreement would be greater than the trade diversion effects of MERCOSUR and the 
Andean Community.  
VI – Conclusions 
  This study indicates that U.S. cotton exports to the top eight importers area 
positively influenced by real GDP in the importing country and negatively influenced by the imported price of cotton, the strength of the U.S. dollar (exchange rate), and tariffs in 
the importing countries. 
  Calculated CBI import demand elasticities indicate cotton imports are very 
insensitive to income/GDP and the import price of cotton. On the other hand, imports are 
very sensitive to the exchange rate. 
  The trade creation and trade diversion effects or tariff removals are analyzed. 
Trade creation effects are substantially greater than trade diversion effects. The favorable 
trade creation effects indicate that the U.S. - CBI agreement has been lucrative with 
respect to U.S. cotton exports to the region for the period 1989 – 2007. The insignificant 
trade diversion effects on U.S. cotton exports to the top eight CBI importers indicates that 
MERCOSUR and the ANDEAN Community has not significantly interfered with U.S. 




 Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Variable (N=152) 
Variable Units  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Sum Min  Max 
Value of Imports  Actual $  3959643 7099997 601865770 54531  42115184
Exchange Rate  Ratio 6.57476 4.69334 999.36414 0.43914  21.57458
Per Capita GDP  Actual $  18787032
2




 0.63158 0.48397 96 0  1
Dummy Variable, 
ANDEAN 
   0.57237 0.49637 87 0  1
 
F Value= 18.09 
  
Pr > F=<.0001    
 
 Table 2: Trade Creation, Trade Diversion, and Trade Expansion 





%  Value   Percent  Value 
 $       2,000,000.00   88   $        300,000.00   12 
 $           
2,300,000.00  
 Table 2: Results of the One-Way Fixed Effect Panel Estimation Procedure 




Pr > ItI 
CS1  -1.74 1.3  -1.34  0.1838 
CS2  -3.72 1.596  -2.33  0.0214 
CS3  1.49 1.46  10.16  <.0001 
CS4  -5.29 1.96  -2.7  0.0079 
CS5  -9.16 1.42  -0.06  0.95 
CS6  2.74 1.04  2.63  0.0095 
CS7  3.28 1.25  2.63  0.0095 
Intercept  5.28 1.94  2.72  0.0074 
Dummy Variable, 
MERCSOUR 
6.66 6.32  1.05  0.2938 
Dummy Variable, 
ANDEAN 
-5.79 2.23  -2.57  0.0111 
Exchange Rate  -9.33 6.97  -1.34  0.1828 
Per Capita GDP  0.0074 0.00129  5.76  <.0001 
R
2  0.82     
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